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An Analysis of F-105 Combat Losses in

(Out-Country) (Unclassified Title)

Jerry D. O'Brien Jay M. Meiselman, 2d Lt, USAF

TECHNICAL REPORT AFFDL-TR-67-118 September 1967

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Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory Research and Technology Division Air Force Systems Command Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio

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An Analysis of F-105 Combat Losses in SEA (Out-Country) (Unclassified Title)

Jerry D. O'Brien Jay M. Meiselman, 2d Lt. USAF

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FOREWORD

This report was prepared by the Structures Division of the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory (AFFDL), Research and Technology Division, Air Force Systems Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. This work was performed under Project 1368, "Structural Design Concepts," Task 136814, "Aircraft Vulnerability." Lt Jay M. Meiselman (FDTS) was the project engineer.

This report contains data which has been extracted from the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) Compendium of Aircraft Combat Losses and Damages in Southeast Asia from 1 February 1965 to 31 January 1966 (U), Volume I: Losses, dated July 1966. The subject report is classified SECRET, Group 3, No Foreign Dissemination.

This report was submitted by the authors July 1967.

This rechnical report has been reviewed and is approved.

FREDERICK C. KRUG, Colonel Chief, Structures Division

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UNCLASSIFIED ABSTRACT

This report contains an analysis of F-105 aircraft losses based on the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) Compendium of Aircraft Losses for the time period of 1 February 1965 to 31 January 1966. The analysis is performed for the purpose of providing an insight into areas such as threat, cause of aircraft loss, and time from initial damage to loss. (In addition to security requirements which must be met, this abstract is subject to special export controls and each transmittal to foreign governments or foreign nationals may be made only with prior approval of the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory (FDTS), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 45433.)

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SECTION I

INTRODUCTION

- (U) A two-volume compendium containing the damage and losses data was published by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) to provide a source of information identifying combat data which would be useful for R&D purposes. The information was compiled for the period of 1 February 1965 to 31 January 1966 and was published without being analyzed. The information for the Air Force aircraft losses is limited to North Vietnam and Laos. A case history for each aircraft loss incident is contained in the compendium in the form of an Aircraft Combat Loss Report.
- (U) The authors attempt to analyze the WSEG data in order to provide an insight into areas such as threat, cause of loss, and time from damage to loss. Due to many unknowns, an effort was made to estimate a most reasonable answer to many of the parameters presented. This estimate was arrived at by looking back to known information such as enemy defenses and reported location of fire. The results hopefully will lead to less vulnerable aircraft in the future and point out areas where possible fixes are needed on present aircraft by providing an insight into the most vulnerable areas and subsystems, thus allowing a judicious choice for the ABCS of survivability ("A" denoting add protection or armor vulnerable components; "B" being bury vulnerable components behind less vulnerable components; "C" representing concentration of vulnerable components to provide a smaller presented area; and "S" being separate redundant critical vulnerable items so that damage to one will not result in highly probable damage to the other).
- (U) Although this report deals solely with the F-105, the analysis methods should be applicable to all aircraft.

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SECTION II

COMPILATION

(U) This report attempts to make a correlation of the WSEG compendium data for the F-105. The tables are presented as compilations of the information contained in the WSEG reports. There are 62 aircraft listed in the tables, but four of these aircraft were lost to causes other than enemy defenses and are not included in the analysis. The last two tables summarize the data on aircraft lost due to flight control and fire damage, respectively. It is obvious from examination of these tables that much data is lacking. In various figures, mis lacking data is presented as "UNK" or unknowns. The handling of the unknowns will be dealt with in Section III of this report.

SECTION III

(U) THE THREAT

- (S) From Table I it is seen that the F-105 is used on a variety of missions. Among these are flak suppression, armed reconnaissance (recce), strike, and close air support. As such, the F-105 is exposed to a hostile environment for which it was not designed. The environment exposes the F-105 to defenses which include small arms, automatic weapons such as 12.7 mm and 14.5 mm; medium antiaircraft such as 23 mm, 37 mm, and 57 mm; heavy antiaircraft artillery such as 85 mm and 100 mm; and SAM's. (See Section IV for an explanation of the letters used in the Type Kill column of Table I.)
- (C) Figure 1 shows the number of aircraft lost as a function of projectile type. The figure contains a large number of the previously mentioned unknowns. Since the lost aircraft are not recovered, it is difficult to determine the exact killing projectile. In Figure 2, an attempt is made to decrease the number of reported kills due to unknown projectiles by making an estimate of projectile type. This estimate is arrived at from an analysis of enemy defenses in the target area. The analysis involves looking at the enemy defenses that the lost aircraft encountered. For example, if the killing projectile was unknown but the defenses were listed as 37 mm and 57 mm, then the kill is placed in the 37-57 mm category in Figure 2.
- (S) Finally we have the number of aircraft lost as a function of altitude and projectile size in Figure 3. The most noticeable trends are the appearance of SAM hits at altitudes over 3000 feet and the disappearance of projectiles of less than 37 mm at 3000 feet. The properties of both weapons predict this occurrence.
- (S) One should keep in mind the fact that North Vietnam antiaircraft defenses are such that heavy and medium antiaircraft batteries are reinforced by many small-arms-firing infantrymen and machine gunners. Thus, many of the unknown kills were relegated to the 37-57 mm category, but the aircraft loss could possibly have been caused by weapons in the category of 14.5 mm or less.

SECTION IV

(U) CAUSE OF LOSS

(C) In the field of aircraft vulnerability, aircraft losses due to battle damage are classed in the categories of KK, K, A, and B kills. These are defined as:

KK -- Instantaneous

K -- Loss within 5 seconds

A -- Loss within 5 minutes

B -- Loss within 30 minutes

Figure 4 shows the number of aircraft lost in each category.

- (S) An examination of the location of hits on the F-105 could possible give a clue as to the most vulnerable areas. Figure 5 shows the number of losses occurring as a function of hit location on the aircraft. It is known (Reference 2) that almost all aircraft are hit on low-level attack missions and that the hits occur on the underside and sides of the aircraft. Examination of Figure 5 indicates that most of the hits causing losses are located between Stations 300 and 777. Station 300 is just aft of the crew station. Station 494 is the start of the engine section, and 777 is the aft end of the aircraft. These stations are for the F-105F but are representative of all F-105 series aircraft. An estimate was used to lower the number of unknowns shown in the Location of Hits column in Table I. The location was estimated in many cases by the observation of damage, i.e., when a fire was reported coming from the tail section it was assumed that the aircraft was hit in the tail section even though the exact location was not reported. It was not possible to account for 21 of the lost aircraft even with this method. Figure 5 has these estimates taken into account. The damage locations have been presented on a view of the F-105 in Figure 6.
- (U) An examination of Figures 7a and 7b shows that many critical components of the aircraft are located in the area between Stations 300 and 777. These components are:
 - a. Engine and compressors
 - b. Fuel tanks
 - c. Fuel lines and pumps
 - d. Stabilizer control actuator
 - e. Hydraulic lines.

It can also be seen that most of these components are on the underside of the aircraft and, thus, are not masked by less vulnerable or less critical components. Figure 8 gives an indication of the density of hydraulic, fuel, and air lines through the bomb bay.

(C) A possible correlation between cause of loss and hits in a certain location would be to examine the failure mode of the lost aircraft. Figure 9 shows the

percentage of aircraft lost experiencing various failure modes. From Figure 9, it is noted that flight control failure and fire occur in most of lost aircraft. Figure 7a shows that all the fuel tanks and fuel lines are between Stations 300 and 777 along with a heat or ignition source (engine). The stabilizer actuator is also in this area along with hydraulic lines and the engine-driven hydraulic pumps. A hit in any of these items could lead to a loss with a reported fire. Both the aircraft fuel and hydraulic fluid are highly flammable and even if the projectile does not perform the ignition function the engine can.

- (S) It is interesting to note on Table I that 50% of the losses on which information was available had fires, 32.8% had no fires, and 17.2% were unknown losses.
- (S) Figure 10 is a representation of the time that the aircraft remains flyable after the aircraft is hit and fire is observed. Since most of the kills are Category A, the pilot does have some time to try to control the fire or to eject.
- (S) The data in Figure 9 also shows that 34.5% of the lost aircraft experienced flight control failure. Since an aircraft can have both fire and flight control failure, the flight control failure due to hydraulic line penetration can lead to a fire or a fire can cause failure of the flight control system through degradation of the hydraulic fluid or seals. Thus, it is often difficult to determine the prime cause of loss. Furthermore, loss of the engine and the associated hydraulic pump power supply driven by the engine can cause loss of flight control before the ram-air turbine, an emergency pump power supply, can be activated. Figure 11 shows the kill category for flight control failure.
- (C) Another consideration from an intelligence standpoint is the attacking sequence of the aircraft when damage was received. Figure 12 shows the formation position, if known, of the aircraft when hit. A possible reason for the decrease in losses to following aircraft, as indicated in Figure 12, could be that the defenders are protecting themselves from explosions from the ordnance delivered by the first aircraft. This is particularly true in a flak suppression mission (Reference 3).
- (S) A brief analysis is performed on pilot survivability according to type of aircraft kill. Survivability is defined as getting out of the aircraft alive regardless of whether the pilot was cartured or returned to his unit. This analysis is based on the data from Table I (Type Kill column) and Table II (Pilot Status column). The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 13. Note that 65% of A kill and 83.3% of B kill pilots survive, indicating the natural conclusion that the longer the aircraft remains under control, the greater the chances of crew survival.
- (S) The following table gives the pilot status for aircraft lost as a function of altitude.

Altitude	Number of Aircraft Lost	Pilot Survives	Pilot Recovered	KIA or MIA
0 to 1000 ft	10	5	3	5
1000 to 3000 ft	7	6	5	1
3000 to 6000 ft	12	10	8	2
greater than 6000 ft	5	2	2	3
unknown	24	9	7	15

(U) The pilot status is shown as a percentage of total losses at altitude bands in Figure 14.

SECTION V

(U) RESULTS

- (U) The objective of this analysis was to determine those factors which contributed to the losses of the F-105 aircraft when subjected to the combat environment encountered in Southeast Asia. Although detailed information was lacking in many of the combat losses reports contained in the WSEG Compendium, it was possible to obtain a general indication of those items which eventually lead to the loss of the aircraft.
- (S) Based on the known information and various estimates, the analysis shows that most aircraft losses were due to subsystem failure or fire rather than primary structural failure. Furthermore, other studies under Air Force Project 5105 have indicated that this is the case for all SEA combat fighter/bomber aircraft.
- (C) It should be noted that there are many items of information missing in the reported data. It is realized that it is difficult to obtain information from an unrecovered aircraft. However, there are many gaps in the data due to unsatisfactory reporting procedures. Efforts are currently under way to attempt to improve the reporting procedures.

SECTION VI

(U) CONCLUSIONS

- (C) As a result of the this analysis, it can be concluded that more detailed information is needed. In many cases, information such as cause of loss or damaging projectile cannot be recovered. However, much of the data needed to achieve a higher degree of confidence in portions of the analysis should be available but is not reported.
- (S) The primary cause of F-105 loss in SEA (Out-Country) during the period studied was due to damage from medium antiaircraft (37-57 mm) weapons with the failure mechanism being fire and subsystem loss, primarily the flight control system. Fires were reported in 50% of the losses. Flight control failure was reported in 34.5% of the losses. Fifty percent of the losses were attributed to ground fire in the 37-57 mm range.

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- 1. Compendium of Aircraft Combat Losses and Damages in Southeast Asia (Out-Country), 1 February 1965 to 31 January 1966, Volume I; Losses (U), Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Arlington, Virginia, July 1966 (Secret Report).
- 2. AFSE Letter dated 18 Nov 1966, Subject: Vulnerability, U.S. Aircraft (U), with 1 Attachment, Preliminary Analysis and Evaluation of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group's Compendium of Aircraft Losses and Damages in SEA (Out-Country Missions) From 1 February 1965 to 31 January 1966, (U).
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



Figure 1. Losses From Known Projectile Type



Projectile Type Based on Area Defenses Figure 2.




Figure 3. Losses as a Function of Altitude and Projectile




Figure 4. Total Aircraft Losses Versus Category of Kill





Figure 5. Number of Aircraft Losses as a Function of Location of Hit








Figure 7a. F-105 Inboard

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



Figure 7a. F-105 Inboard Profile

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Figure 8. F-105 Bomb Bay

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


Figure 9. Percentage of Aircraft Lost Experiencing Various Types of Damage




Figure 10. Category of Kill as a Result of Fire




Figure 11. Category of Kill as a Result of Flight Control Failure




Figure 12. Losses as a Function of Attack Sequence




Figure 13. Pilot Status Versus Kill Category




Figure 14. Pilot Status as a Function of Altitude

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INCIDENT	SORTIE TYPE	SORTIE LOCATION	TARGET TYPE	WEATHER	ENEMY DEFENSE	WEAPONS OF AIRCRAFT	NO.OF AIRCRAFT IN MISSION	STAGE WHEN HIT
1	FLAK Suppression	ROLLING THUNDER 5	MUNITIONS Storage	20% CLOUD, IONI. VISIBILITY	37 OR 57 MM	8 - 750	24 (LEAD OF 4)	ATTACK
2	STRIKE	-	MUNITIONS STORAGE	20% CLOUD, IOMI.VISIBILITY	GROUND FIRE (HEAVY)	8 - 750	24	ATTACK
3	FLAK Suppression		AMMUNITION STORAGE	GLEAR WITH HAZE	AUTO WEAPONS, 37 NM	2 - C B U	4	ATTACK
4	FLAK Suppression	-	AA BOATS OFF SHORE	CLEAR	(MODERATE)	BONBS, ROCKETS	(LEAD MAN)	ATTACK
5	STRIKE	THANH HOA	RAILROAD WITH HIWAY BRIDGE	CLEAR 5 MI.VIS., HAZE 0-1200 FT	GROUND FIRE	750 LB Bombs	48	ATTACK
6	STRIKE	THANH HOA	RAILROAD WITH HIWAY BRIDGE	_	HIG CANNON	_	48 (FLIGHT LEAD)	ORBIT PRIO TO ATTACK
7	STRIKE	THANH HOA	RAILROAD WITH HIWAY BRIDGE	SCATTERED HAZE	MIGS		48	ORBIT PRIOR TO ATTACK
8	ARNED RECCE.		TRUCKS		37 MN	_	4 (THIS MAN #4)	PULLOUT FROM STRAFING PAS
*9	ARNED RECCE.		_			_	4	
10	STRIKE	THANH HOA	BRIDGE	40% CLOUD, 25 MI VISIBILITY	AUTO WEAPONS, 37 & 57 MM	8 - 750	42	ATTACK
l1	ARMED RECCE	STEEL Tiger	FLAK POSITION	SCATT. TO BROKEN TO OVERCAST	(HEAVY)	ROCKET POD, M 61 CANNON	(THIS MAN 2)	_
12	RECCE	ROUTE 7 FROM VINH TO LAOS	TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY	SCATTERED TO BROKEN CLOUDS	14.5, 37 MM HEAVY AUTO, SM. ARMS	ROCKET PODS, 20 MM	(THIS MAN #4)	ROAD RECCE
13	STRIKE BARREL ROLL	-	ROAD	SCATTERED TO BROKEN OVERCST. IO MI. VISIBILITY	GROUND FIRE, LIGHT AA, AUTO.WEAPONS	8-750, MGI CANNON	4 (LEAD NAN)	ATTACK
14	ROAD RECCE	ROUTES A, B, & C	BRIDGE, ROADS	50% CLOUD, ISMI. VISIBITITY	AUTO. WEAPONS (LIGHT)	ROCKETS	12	_
15	STRIKE	THAN HOA	BRIDGE	15-16,000 FT CLOUD LAYER	GROUND FIRE	8 - 750	4	ATTACK
16	RESCAP FOR A4C	LAOS	_		GROUND FIRE (HEAVY)			ORDINANCE DELIVERY PAS
17	ARMED RECCE	·	WOODEN BRIDGE	70% CLOUD, 10 MI. VISIBILITY	GROUND FIRE (HEAVY)		(LEAD MAN)	ATTACK
18	STRIKE	BON XON LON	ARMY BARRAKS	II,000 FT, BROKEN	37, 57, 8 85 MM AUTO. WEAPONS	. 8 - 750	4 (LEAD MAN)	ATTACK
19	ARNED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 19 C	CONCRETE BRIDGE	4500 FT, OVERCAST	AUTO WEAPONS (HEAVY)	8 - 750	4	ATTACK
			<u>L</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	

^{*} NOT USED IN ANALYSIS



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TABLE I
WSEG DATA SUMMARY

			 			 	ſ 			·
NS OF RAFT	NO. OF A IRCRAFT IN MISSION	STAGE WHEN HIT	BASIC MANEUVER	STARTING ALTITUDE	ALTITUDE WHEN HIT	VELOCITY WHEN HIT	PROJECTILE Type	DIRECT OR FRAGMENT	LOCATION OF HIT	RESUI Dan
0	24 (LEAD OF 4)	ATTACK	PULLOUT AFTER BOMBING	_	_	_	37 OR 57 MM	_	TAIL	HYDRAU FLIGHT C
0	24	AT TA CK	_	_	-	_	_	_		AC CENE
U	4	ATTACK	LEVEL FLIGHT	10,000	20 FT	500 KIAS	37 NM	DIRECT	NOSE, LT. WING ENG COMP ELEC. SYS.	ELECT
s	(KAM DASL)	ATTACK		_	-	_	-		AFT SECTION	FIRE IN F
	48	ATTACK	BOMB RUN	-	_	_	-		_	FIRE IN
	48 (FLIGHT LEAD)	ORBIT PRIOR TO ATTACK	ORBIT ING	_	-	_	CANNON FIRE		_	DANAGE CANNON
	48	ORBIT PRIOR	ORBITING	_			CANNON FIRE MIG 23 & 37 M M	DIRECT	LT. SIDE FROM SP. BK. TO CANOPY	LOST A
ř	(THIS MAN #4)	PULLOUT FROM STRAFING PASS	STRAFING PASS			420 KTS	_		_	FIRE AN
	4	_	ROCKET ATTACK	. 6000	_	305 KTS	<u> </u>		(HIT HILL IN	
50	42	ATTACK	DIVE BONB	13-14,000	4500 FT	-	_		RIGHT WING ROOT	STABILI
POD, MON	2 (THIS NAN [#] 2)	_		_			_		?	
PODS,	(THIS MAN #4)	ROAD RECCE	ROAD RECCE	3000	3000	450	37 MN	DIRECT	FUEL CONT. OR MAIN FUEL LINE	ENGINE
NON	(LEAD MAH)	ATTACK	DIVE BONB DELIVERY		3000 AGL	_	_		?	FIRE
	12				1000 AGL			,	ELECTRONICS IN FUSELAGE BOYN.	FIRE
	4	ATTACK	DIVE BOMB	18,000	_		_		_	FIRE TAIL
		ORDINANCE DELIVERY PASS	ORD IN ANCE DELIVERY PASS		4000	_			_	LOSS OF (
	(LEAD MAN)	ATTACK	EVASIVE CLIMB AFTER PASS		4000	_	GROUND FIRE	_	AFT SECTION	FIRE
)	4 (LEAD MAN)	ATTACK	DIVE BOMB PASS	7000 AGL	4000 AGL	500		•		
	4	ATTACK	DIVE BOMB RUN, BOMBS DID NOT RELEASE	4500 MSL I500 PULLOUT		300 KTS	AUTO WEAPON .			FIRE OU COMING TAIL

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C VER	STARTING ALTITUDE	ALTITUDE WHEN HIT	VELOCITY When hit	PROJECTILE Type	DIRECT OR FRAGMENT	LOCATION OF HIT	RESULTANT DAMAGE	TYPE KILL
AFTER G	_	_	_	37 OR 57 MM		TAIL	HYDRAULIC PRESS. FLIGHT CONTROL	В
	_	-	_	_	_		AC GENERATOR, LOST NAV. AIDS	В
LIGHT	10,000	20 FT	500 KIAS	37 MN	DIRECT	NOSE, LT. WING ENG COMP ELEC. SYS.		A
	-	_	_	-	-	AFT SECTION	FIRE IN FUSELAGE,& INTAKES,COMP.STALL	_
RUN		_		-		_	FIRE IN AFT SECTION	-
NG	_	_		CANNON FIRE		_	DAMAGED BY CANNON FIRE	В
N G	_	_	<u> </u>	CANNON FIRE MIG 23 & 37 M M	DIRECT	LT. SIDE FROM SR. BK. TO CANOPY	LOST ALL CONTROL	-
NG		_	420 KTS			_	FIRE AND CONTROL LOSS	٨
T K	6000	_	305 KTS			(HIT HILL IN DIVE)		_
OM B K	13-14,000	4500 FT				RIGHT WING ROOT	STABILITY AUGMENTATION	٨
•	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		_		?	?	KK
ECCE	3000	3000	450	37 NN	DIRECT	FUEL CONT. OR MAIN FUEL LINE	ENGINE FLAMEOUT	A
OMB Ry		3000 AGL		_		?	FIRE	Å
_		1000 AGL	_			ELECTRONICS IN FUSELAGE BOTN.	FIRE	В
OMB	18,000	_				_	FIRE IN TAIL	٨
NCE Y Pass		4000				_	LOSS OF RT. WING TANK & PYLON	В
CLIMB Pass		4000		GROUND FIRE	-	AFT SECTION	FIRE	· A
80MB	7000 AGL	4000 AGL	500					A:
MB RUN, DID NOT SE	4500 MSL !500 PULLOUT		300 KTS	AUTO WEAPON . FIRE	·	_	FIRE OBSERVED COMING FROM TAIL	٨



TABLE I

INCIDENT	SORTIE TYPE	SORTIE LOCATION	TARGET TYPE	WEATHER	ENENY DEFENSE	WEAPONS OF AIRCRAFT	NO. OF AIRCRAFT IN MISSION	STAGE WHEN HIT
20	ARMED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 21C	BRIDGE	20,000 FT, THIN OVER CAST	57 MM (HEAVY)	6-750, 2 LAU3A PODS	(THIS MAN #2)	ATTACK
21	_	_	RESCAP FOR DOWNED NAVY CREW	3000 FT, OVERCAST	37MM (LIGHT)	20 MM	(LEAD MAN)	RESCAP
22	AR MED REGCE	_	BARRACKS AREA		37,57 MM AUTO WEAPONS (INTENSE)	_	U	APPROACH TO TARGET
23	STRIKE	_	CAN DOI BKS.	CLEAR, 10 MI VISIBILITY	37-57 MM2AUTO WEAP (HEAVY)	_	15	ATTAC'K
24		HAN01	SAM SITE # 7	CLEAR, UNLIN- ITED VISIBILITY	37MM & AUTO WEAR (INTENSE)	-	12 (This Man ♥2)	AFTER WEAPON RELEASE
25		?	SAM SITE #7	CLEAR, UNLIMITED VISIBILITY	GROUND FIRE (HEAVY)	_	12	AFTER NAPALN RELEASE
*26		?	SAN SITE #6		GROUND FIRE (VERY HEAVY)		H	OVER TARGET
*27	_	?	SAN SITE #6		GROUND FIRE (VERY HEAVY)		11	-
28	AR MED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 25-C4	BRIDGE	10,000 OVERCST. 5 ML VISIBILITY	37, 57, 85,1 100 MM AUTO WEAR	2 - 3000	5	PRIOR TO BOMB RELEASE
29	ARMED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 25-C5	BARGES	80% CLOUD COVER AT 20,000 FT	12.7 MM AUTO WEAPONS (HEAVY)	38 - 2.75" ROCKETS	? (THIS MAN #1)	ATTACK
-30	STRIKE	ROLLING THUNDER 25-A-3	BRIDGES	90% CLOUD COVER AT 25,000 FT	37MN (LIGHT)	2 - 3000	(THIS NAN #4)	ATTACK
31	AR MED R E C CE	ROLLING THUNDER 26 - C - 6	RADAR SITE	CLEAR, 15 MI VISIBILITY	37NN . (LIGHT)		4	ATTAC K
32 ,	A R MED RE CCE	ROLLING THUNDER 28-C-5	•					ATTACK
33	AR NED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 29-C-2	BARRAGKS AREA	SCATTERED CLOUDS 7000'	AUTO WEAPONS & SM. ARMS(LT)	20 MM SHAKE BOMBS	4	ATTACK
34	AR MED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 29-C-4	YEN BAY Arsenal	2000' BROKEN TO OVERCAST, IO MI. VISIBILITY	20 MM, 37 MM (HEAVY)	6 - 750	4 (THIS MAN #4)	ATTACK
35	ARMED RECCE	LEFT HOOK ALERY	BRIDGE	CLEAR, 10 MI. VISIBILITY	37 N N, 57 NM (MODERATE)	NAPALN	2 .	ATTACK
36	ARMED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 29-C-7	BRIDGE	SCATTERED TO BROKEN, GOOD VISIBILITY	37 MM OR 57 MM (LIGHT)	6 · 7 50 2 LAU	4	ATTACK

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'ABLE I (Cont'd)

STAGE HEN HIT	BASIC MANEUVER	STARTING ALTITUDE	ALTITUDE WHEN HIT	VELOCITY WHEN HIT	PROJECTIL E TYPE	DIRECT OR FRAGMENT	LOCATION OF HIT	RESULTANT DAMAGE	TYPE
TTACK	DIVE BONB	17,000	5000	450	AUTO WEAPON FIRE	DIRECT	AFT OF COCKPIT	FIRE FROM WING ROOT	A
ESCAP	TURNING, GOING INTO ORBIT	3000 AGL	3000 AGL	350-400 KTS	37 MM	DIRECT	ACCESSORY SECTION	FIRE, LOST STABILIZER CONTROL	A
PPRUACH TO ARGET	LEFT BREAK TO AVOID FLAK		800	500	AUTO WEAPON FIRE			ENGINE POWER LOSS -FLIGHT CONTROL FAILURE	٨
TTACK	NAPALM RUN	100 AGL	100 AGL	500 KTS		<u></u>		FIRE LT. WING RT- PART OF LEFT WING MISSING	À
FTER WEAPON ELEASE	EVADING AA FIRE	_			_		·	POSSIBLE FLIGHT CONTROL FAILURE	A
FTER NAPALN ELEASE	LOW-LEVEL NAPALM DELIV.		50 AGL					BURNING FROM FWD. OF INTAKES	A
VER TARGET		_					FLAK HIT NOSE SECTION	-	A
	_			_			MID AIR COLLISION		
RIOR TO BOMB ELEASE	DIVE RECOVERY AT REL. POINT	10,000	5000	450	37 OR 57 MM	FRAGMENTS	BETWEEN RIGHT WING & FUSELAGE	FIREAT HIT LOC., FLT. CONT. LOSS	A
ATTACK	ROCKET PASS						·	FIRE OBSERVED AT AFT. SECT., FLIGHT CONTS & HYD.	A
ATTA CK	DURING DIVE RUN OR AFTER PULL-UP	16,000		450	37 NN		ENGINE INTAKE		В
ATTACK	START OF PULL- UP FROM STRAFING PASS			_				FUEL INLET PRESS, FUEL PUNP, LIGHTS ON STAB. AUGNENT.	A
TTACK	PULL-UP FROM ATTACK		6-7000	500				FIRE	A
ITTACK	WEAPONS DELIVERY PASS						_	FIRE IN TAIL PIPE, HIS GUN EXPLODED	A
ATTA CK	LOW-LEVEL HIGH SPEED ATTACK	50 - 100	50-100	550 KTS	20 OR 37 MM	-		FIRE IN BATTERY COMP., ELECT. & FLIGHT CONTROLS	A
ATTACK	DIVE HIT AT NAPALM DROP PT.	8 000	3000	450	37 NN	DIRECT	FUSELAGE- BOMB BAY TO AFT SECT	FLIGHT CONTROL	A
ATTACK	DIVE BONB	10,000		500 - 530	37 OR 57 MM	DIRECT (ASSUMED)		NO FIRE, POSSIBLY FLIGHT CONTROL	K

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		4					·	
INCIDENT	SORTIE TYPE	SORTIE LOCATION	TARGET TYPE	WEATHER	ENEMY Defense	WEAPONS OF AIRCRAFT	NO. OF AIRCRAFT In Mission	STAGE WHEN HIT
37	ARNED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 30-C-4	RADIO COMMUN- ICATIONS SITE	70% CLOUD COVER AT 13,000'	37,57 MM AUTO WEAPONS (HEAVY)	_	(THIS MAN #2)	ATTACK
38	STRIKE	IRON HAND	SAM SITE	CLEAR, 20 MI VISIBILITY	37 MM, 57 MM (ME DIUM)		(LEAD MAN)	
39	STRIKE	IRON HAND	SAN SITE	CLEAR, 15 MI VISIBILITY	SMALL ARMS Or 37 Mm	NAPALN AND 20 MM	(LEAD HAN)	RUN-IN TO TARGET
40	AR MED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 32-C-1	BARRACKS Building	CLEAR,UNLIM- ITED VISIBILITY	37MM (MODERATE)	2 PODS OF 2.75" ROCKETS	4 (THIS MAN #2)	ATTACK
41	ARMED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 32-C-4	BRIDGE	_			3 (THIS MAN #2)	ATTACK
42	ARMED RECCE	DONG BAI NVN	BRIDGE	CLOUD BASE 6000', 7ML VISIBILITY, 80% CLOUD COVER	GROUND FIRE (HEAVY)	_	4	ATTACK
43	ARMED RECCE	STEEL TIGER	MILITARY BUILDINGS	CEILING UNLIM - ITED, 15 MI. VIS.	AUTO WEAPONS 57 MM (MEDIUM)		(LEAD MAN)	ATTACK
44	ARMED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 33-C-7	NINH BINH HIWAY BRIDGE	26,000'CEILING 7 MI. VISIBILITY	SAN'S	NONE	2	ORBITING DIRECTING STI
45	ROLLING THUNDER		LANG MET HIWAY BRIDGE	_	GROUND FIRE (HEAVY)		4	
46	STRIKE	<u>-</u>	LANG MET HIWAY BRIDGE	BROKEN LAYER AT 3000', RAIN, THUNDERSTORMS, SHOWERS	37 N M, 57NN , 85 N M	6 - 750	3 (LEAD MAN)	ATTACK
47	•••		BRIDGE				4 (LEAD)	BDA RUN AFT Attack
48	ARMED RECCE	ROLLING Technology	BARRACKS & STORAGE AREA	7000'OVERCAST, 10 MI. VISIBILITY	20 GUNS OF 37-57 VARIETY	8 - 750 GP BONBS	4 (LEAD)	ATTACK
49	ARMED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 36-C-I	BARRACKS & STORAGE AREA		20 GUNS OF 37-57 VARIETY	8-750 GP BONBS	4 (THIS MAN #2)	RESCAP
50	ARMED RECCE	ROLLING THUNDER 37-C-I	SAM SITE	2000'SCATTERED 5 MI VISIBILITY IN HAZE	37,57 NM AUTO WEAPONS (HEAVY)	CBU'S AND SMAKEYE BONBS	4 (LEAD)	ATTACK
*51	ARMED RECCE		BRIDGE	12,000'OVERCAST 7 NI. VISIBLITY		6 BOMBS	(THIS MAN #4)	ATTACK
52	(AIRBORNE IR	ON HAND)	TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY	1500-2500 FT OVERCAST 2 MI.VISIBILITY	SAN'S (3)	750 LB BOMBS	4 (LEAD)	APPROACH TARGET ARE
53	ARNED RECCE	ROLLING THURDER 40	RO/	CLOUDS BROKEN AT 3000 FT, 7 MI VISIBILITY IN RAIN	SAN'S (2)	2.75"ROCKETS	(THIS MAN #4)	OUT BOAR FROM TAR
				*** ******				

^{*}NOT USED IN ANALYSIS



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TABLE 1 (Cont'd)

INS OF CRAFT	NO OF AIRCRAFT IN MISSION	STAGE WHEN HIT	Basic Maneuver	Starting Altitude	ALTITUDE WHEN HIT	WELOCITY WHEN HIT	PROJECTILE TYPE	DIRECT OR FRAGMENT	LOCATION OF HIT	
	(THIS NAN #2)	ATTACK	PULL-UP AFTER RELEASE	****	6000	500 KTS	_		TAIL SECTION	FLI
tre .	(LEAD MAN)				MINIMUM				_	EN
LM AND	(LEAD MAN)	RUN=IN TO TARGET	LOW-LEVEL RUN	150 FT	150 FT	510 KTS	SMALL ARMS OR 37 MM	DIRECT	BOMB BAY	FIR
s of Rockets	4 (This man #2)	ATTACK	PULLOUT ON ROCKET PASS	8000	500 AGL		-		·	EXI AF
	(THIS MAN #2)	ATTACK	ROCKET PASS	7 - 8000		350 KTS				ÄH
	4	ATTACK	DIVE BOMB DELIVERY	7000						A F ON
	(LEAD NAN)	ATTAC K	ROCKET PASS CLIMB OUT		45 00	500 KTS	57 MM			FI
		or biting Directing Strike	ORBITING AS MISSION COORD.		18, 000		SAM	?		
	4		-	ATTACA MENTAL PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PART						Γ
750	3 (LEAD MAN)	ATTACK	DEPARTING AREA AFTER BOMB DROP	1500	1500	480				FIR OF FLI
	4 (LEAD)	ODA RUN AFTER ATTACK	TURN TO RIGHT ON BOA RUN	**************************************	2000 AGL				REAR PART OF AIRCRAFT	HYD FLI
O GP	(LEAD)	ATTACK	PULL UP AFTER PASS ON TARGET				37-57 MM	****		
O GP	(THIS MAN #2)	RESCAP	Percey		2			_	UNKROWN	1
ANO Y E	(FEVD)	ATTAOK	LOW-LEVEL HIGH-SPEED OBU DELIVERY	400 AGL	400 AGL	550	AUTO WEAPONS	DIRECT		FIR FUS BO
06	(THIS MAN #4)	ATTACK	DIVE BOMB	11,000 MSL					HIT MOUNTAIN	HI.
BOMBS	(LEAD)	APPROACH TO TARGET AREA	A P P R O A C H	6500	6500 _	. 450 K (EAS)	SAN (SA-2)	FRAGMENTS	SAN DETONATED 20 FT UNDER AIRCRAFT	BU A/ TO
ROCKETS	(THIS MAN #4)	OUTBOARD FROM TARGET			4000	400	(PILOT SAID IT WAS A SAM)	Material Prints		FI

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SECRET



STARTING ALTITUDE	ALTITUDE WHEN HIT	VELOCITY WHEN HIT	PROJECTILE TYPE	DIRECT OR FRAGMENT	LOCATION OF HIT	RESULTA NT Danage	TY PE KILL
:	6000	500 KTS	-		TAIL SECTION	ELECTRICAL ENG. FLIGHT CONTROL	A
	MINIMUN ALTITUDE					ENGINE AFFECTED	٨
150 FT	150 FT	510 KTS	SMALL ARMS OR 37 MM	DIRECT	BOMB BAY	FIRE IN BOMB BAY Engine	A
8000	500 AGL			_	· _	EXPLOSION IN AFT SECTION	A
7 - 8000	_	350 KTS				MAY HAVE HIT TREES WHEN TURNING	KK
7000	_	~	_		_	AFT SECTION ON FIRE	A
_	45 00	500 KTS	57 MN	· _	_	FIRE	A
	18, 000	_	SAM	?		-	KK
	_						_
1500	1500	480		_	_	FIRE LEFT SIDE OF AIRCRAFT . FLIGHT CONTROLS	K
	2000 AGL	***************************************			REAR PART OF AIRCRAFT	HYDRAULIC SYS. & FLIGHT CONTROL	A
	_		37-57 NM	_			A
				_	UN K HOW N	UNKNOWN	
400 AGL	400 AGL	5 50	AUTO WEAPONS	DIRECT		FIRE ON FUSELAGE BOTTOM	٨
II,000 MSL	_	====		_	HIT MOUNTAIN	HIT NOUNTAIN	
6500	6500	450 K (EAS)	SAM (SA-2)	FRAG MENTS	SAM DETONATED 20 FT UNDER AIRCRAFT	BURST IN FLAMES A/C SHREDDED TO PIECES	KK
	4000	400	(PILOT SAID IT WAS A SAM)			FIRE, AIRCRAFT DISINTEGRATED	K



TABLE I (Cq

S4 — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —	INCIDENT	SORTIE TYPE	SORTIE LOCATION	TARGET TYPE	WEATHER	ENEMY DEFENSE	WEAPONS OF AIRCRAFT	NO. OF AIRCRAFT IN MISSION	STAGE WHEN HIT	BA: MAN
THUNDER SARRACAS 3 M. VISIBILITY IN HAZE THUNDER RR BRIDGE RR BRIDGE SCATTERED, IO ML VISIBILITY IN HAZE THUNDER RR BRIDGE THUNDER POWER PLANT SCATTERED, IO ML VISIBILITY IN HAZE THUNDER POWER PLANT SCATTERED, IO ML VISIBILITY IN HAZE THUNDER POWER PLANT SCATTERED, IO ML VISIBILITY IN HAZE THUNDER POWER PLANT STANDAR THUNDER POWER PLANT SCATTERED, IO MEAPONS (LIGHT) TARGET AUTO WEAPONS (LIGHT) TARGET THUNDER THUNDER THUNDER AUTO WEAPONS (LIGHT) THUNDER THUNDER AUTO WEAPONS (LIGHT) THUNDER THUN	54	:						(LEAD)	ATTACK	CLIMI POSIT ROCKI
THUNDER RR BRIDGE SCATTERED, IO MILVISIBILITY ACCURATE) ROLLING THUNDER PLANT 2500 FT, 7MI VISIBILITY IN HAZE VU CHUA, NVN RR BRIDGE 1000 FT OVERCAST 37 MM OR 57 MM FT OVERCAST 57 MM FT OVER	55			BARRACKS	3 M. VISIBILITY	_	_	(THIS MAN #2)	ATTACK	HIGH STRAF
THUNDER THU	56			RR BRIDGE	SCATTERED,	(HEAVY &		(THIS NAN #3)	ATTACK	POP-U ORDIN DELI
NVN RR BRIDGE OVERCAST 57 MM 6-750 (THIS MAN #3) TARGET 1	57			POWER PLANT	2500 FT, 7 MI VISIBILITY IN	WEAPONS		1 '		-
THUNDER) THUNDER TH	58			RR BRIDGE	I .		6 - 750			LEFT BANK DOWN
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ROLLING THUNDER 48-C-4 BRIDGE LIGHT HAZE, 7 MI VISIBILITY LIGHT HAZE, 7 MI VISIBILITY (LIGHT) 8-750 (THIS MAN #3) ATTACK CLOSE AIR 50 (THIS MAN #5) ATTACK RECCE AND FIRE 20 MM (THIS MAN #5) ATTACK RECCE ATTACK THUNDER 48-C-4 BARGES CLOSE AIR 50 (THIS MAN #5) ATTACK THUNDER 48-C-4 RECCE ATTACK CHIS MAN #2) ATTACK THUNDER 48-C-4 RECCE	59	:		BRIDGE			6 - 750		ATTAC K	PULLO BOMB
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT POSITIONS & SCATTERED BASE, 8-9000 FT RECCE RECCE RECCE ROUTES IA AMATERWAY BARGES ROUTES IA AMATERWAY BARGES ROUTES IA AMATERWAY BARGES ROUTES IA AMATERWAY BARGES ROUND FIRE 20 MM (THIS NAM # 5) ATTACK CHIS NAM # 5) RECCE (THIS NAM # 2) RECCE	60	BARREL ROLL	(LAOS)	BRIDGE	LIGHT HAZE,		8 - 750	(THIS MAN #3)	ATT A C·K	PULL FROM BOMB
RECCE THUNDER AWATERWAY AT 1200-1600 FT NN 20 MM (THIS NAM #2)	61		_	POSITIONS &	SCATTERED	GROUND FIRE	20 N M	(THIS NAN #5)	ATTACK	STRAF
	62	i i	THUNDER	& WATERWAY	AT 1200-1600 FT SOLI D AT		ROCKETS 20 NM		REGGE	LOW -



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SECRET

ABLE I (Cont'd)

BASIC MANEUVER	STARTING ALTITUDE	ALTITUDE WHEN HIT	VELOCITY WHEN HIT	PROJECTILE Type	DIRECT OR FRAGMENT	LOCATION OF HIT	RESULTANT DANAGE	TYPE KILL
CLIMB TO POSITION FOR ROCKET PASS		5000	_		_	_	FUEL COMING OUT OF A/C, FIRE FLIGHT CONTROLS	A
HIGH ANGLE STRAFE PASS	7000 AGL	_	_				FLIGHT CONTROLS	A
POP-UP FOR ORDINANCE DELIVERY		8 - 9000 FT	515	37 M N	DIRECT	_	· -	K
		2500	450	37 NN	_	_	FIRE (TRAILING AIRCRAFT)	-
LEFT TURN & BANK TO LET- DOWN ON TARGET		4000	350 KTS	_	- (PILOT FELT THUMP)	_	FIRE, LOST FLIGHT CONTROLS	٨
PULLOUT AFTER BOMB RELEASE		7-8000 FT	450	57 NM	DIRECT	TAIL HOOK AREA	FIRE, UTILITY & HYDRAULIC SYS, FLIGHT CONTROLS	٨
PULLOUT FROM OWN BOMB RUN:		4 500	500	A/C OWN BOMB (ERCHATURE)	_		FIRE	À
STRAFE PASS	_				_		_	-
LOW-LEVEL ARNED RECCE	**************************************		_					PROB
	CLIMB TO POSITION FOR ROCKET PASS HIGH ANGLE STRAFE PASS POP -UP FOR ORDINANCE DELIVERY LEFT TURN & BANK TO LET- DOWN ON TARGET PULLOUT FROM OWN BOMB RUN: STRAFE PASS LOW - LEVEL	MANEUVER ALTITUDE CLIMB TO POSITION FOR ROCKET PASS HIGH ANGLE STRAFE PASS POP - UP FOR ORDINANCE DELIVERY LEFT TURN & BANK TO LET- DOWN ON TARGET PULLOUT AFTER BOMB RELEASE PULLOUT FROM OWN BOMB RUN STRAFE PASS LOW - LEVEL	NAMEUVER ALTITUDE WHEN HIT CLIMB TO POSITION FOR ROCKET PASS HIGH ANGLE STRAFE PASS POP - UP FOR ORDINANCE DELIVERY	NAMEUVER ALTITUDE WHEN HIT CLIMB TO POSITION FOR TOCKET PASS - 5000 - HIGH ANGLE STRAFE PASS TOOO AGL - POP - UP FOR ORDINA NCE DELIVERY - 2500 450 LEFT TURN & ABANK TO LETDOWN ON TARGET - 4000 350 KTS PULLOUT AFTER BOMB RELEASE - 7-8000 FT 450 STRAFE PASS LOW - LEVEL	NAMEUVER	NAMEUVER	MAMEUVER	NAMEUVER ALTITUDE WHEN HIT WHEN HIT TYPE FRAGMENT OF HIT DAMAGE CLIMB TO POSITION FOR ROCKET PASS - 5000



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DATA SOURCES TABLE II

— ¬						_			_		7	7	1	-	7	7		_		7	7	_	_		7	П	Т	\neg	_			
SEARCH AND RESCUE REPORT	*	×	×	×						=				×			×	×	×	*		*						×	×			
FORM 484					X		×				×		*		X			×		~			*	×								
PILOT			X					*				=		1			×		×			×									-	
PILOT Interviewed			X																		X											
WINGNAN WINGNAN PILOT PILOT INTERVIEWED STATEMENT (HTERVIEWED STATEMENT					X	¥	×				=		×		×			×		*	×		×	×	×			=				
WINGNAN												×						*										X		×		
ESCAPE AND EVASION REPORT	Ħ																				×											
MISHAP REPORT																																
COACT	×	=		×	=	X	×	X		1			¥	X			×	×					X						×	×	×	
USAF COMMAND POST RECORDS	×	*	×	×	×	X	X	X	X	I	X	. **	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	¥	X	H	X	X	X	
PILOT STATUS	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	DETAINED	KIA	MILA	RECOVERED	KIA	RECOVERED	MIA	RECOVERED	DETAINED	RECOVERED	DETAINED	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	DETAINED	RECOVERED	KIA	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	XIX.	MIA	PEIAINED	KIA	KIA	DETAINED	KIA	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	
ORGANIZATION	19 TFW	16 TFW	IS TFE	IS TFW	18 TFW	355 TFW	18 TFW	355 TF#	23 TFW	355 TFW	23 TFW	is TFW	58 3 TFS	355 TFW	35 TFS	23 TFW	355 TFW	18 TFT	355 TFW	IS TFW	644! TFW	18 TFW	IS TFW	23 TFW	23 TFW	355 TFW	355 TFW	18 TFW	355TFW	18 TFW	563 TFS	
TAIL	0925-29	62-4325	61-4214	62-4233	62-4217	59-1754	59-1764	59-1742	1210-19	59-1716	62-4408	2224- 29	59-1731	61-6054	62-4381	\$610-19	62-0290	62-4220	62- 4319	62-4232		1014-29	82-4252		61-0-13	11:0-19	61 - 4298	65-4549	61-098	181-19	2110-19	
DATE	2 MAR 65	2 MAR 65	2 MAR 65	22 MAR 65	4 APR 65	4 APR 65	4 APR 65	5 APR 65	17 APR 65	7 MAT 65	9 MAY 65	9 KAY 65	18 MAY 65	23 MAY 65	31 MAY 65	5 101 65	8 JUNE 65	14 JUN 65	23 JUN 65	7 JUL 65	24 JUL 65	27 JUL 65	2 AUG 65	3 AUG 65	10 AUG 65	11 AUG 65						
INCIDENT	-	2		-	45	•	-	•	•	2	=	21	13	=	15	=	=	=	=	22	12	22	22	77	52	97 ×	₩ 27	82	82	30	31	

NE NOT USED IN ANALYSIS

SEARCH AND RESCUE REPORT	X	X	×	X	X	K			X		X	K				×	×	×			×		*	×		X	×	X	X	X	×
FORM 484		×	×		X		1	X	×	×	×		×	×	*		×	=	=	×	×			×	×					×	×
PILOT STATEMENT	×			X		X						×				×											×	×	X	×	
PILOT INTERVIEWED				×																								×			
WINGMAN STATEMENT		X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	К		X	X		X	×			X	X						×
WINGHAM					X			×							X				X												
ESCAPE AND EVASION REPORT																×													×		
MISHAP	×			*		×	×	×	×	*	×	=	*	×	X	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	X		*	×	X	×	×	×	X
COACT		X	X	×	×	*	*	*	×	×		×							×		×	×			×	×			×		X
USAF COMMAND POST RECORDS	X	×	×	×	×	×	¥	X	×	×	X	×	×	×	X	K	×	X	X	×	X	×	×	×	×	×	*	X	×	X	×
PILOT STATUS	RECOVERED	¥i H	DETAINED	RECOVERED	KIA	RECOVERED	MIA	MIA	MIA	MIA	MIA	RECOVERED	MIA	MIA	MIA	RECOVERED	MIA	MIA	MIA	¥I.¥	MIA	KIA	RECOVERED	MIA	¥	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	RECOVERED	MIA	HIA
GRCANIZATION	6441 TFW	IS TFW	16 TFW	18 TFW	6441 TFW	18 TFW	AS TFW	16 TF W	18 TFW	18 TFW	334 TFS	562 TFS	334 TFS	6441 TFW	6441 TFW	562 TFS	6441TFW	6441TFW	6441 TFW	23 TFW	355 TF W	6234 TFW	6234TFW	355 TFW	355 TF W	355 TF W	355TFW	6234 TFW	355 TFW	355 TFW	6234 TFW
TAIL RUNDER	62-4235	63 - 8282	61-0193	61-0185	65-4389	62-4337	6110-19	61-0217	62-4247	62-4328	60-0382	0070-19	1110-09	62-4285	62 - 4376	0110-19	62-4333	62-4305	62-4350	61-0163	62-4342	62-4332	290-19	62-4285	2010-19		61-0090	59-1823	59-1736	59-1719	0120-19
DATE	23 AUG 65	28 AUG 65	29 AUG 65	31 AUG 65	\$9 d35 2	6 SEP 65	16 SEP 65	16 SEP 65	17 SEP 65	20 SEP 65	20 SEP 65	21 SEP 65	30 SEP 65	5 OCT 65	S 0CT 65	13 OCT 65	15 OCT 65	15 OCT 65	22 OCT 65	3 NOV 65	S NOW 65	16 NOV 65	18 NOV 65	28 NON 85	1 DEC 65	15 DEC 65	20 DEC 65	21 DEC 65	11 JAN 66	16 JAN 66	31 JAK 66
INCIDENT	28	33	*	35	38	3.5	38	38	9	Ŧ	42	63	=	45	9\$	2.5	=	\$	20	* 5!	25	53	25	55	26	53	28	59	09	19	29

* NOT USED IN ANALYSIS

TABLE III FLIGHT CONTROL FAILURES

DESCRIPTION OF HIT OR DANAGE WHICH RESULTED IN LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROL SYS.		HYDR AUL!	HYDRAULIC PRESSURE LOST ON	E LOST ON	FINAL MANEUVER	FIRE	TYPE
		-	2.				
A/C HIT I STABILIZ	A/C HIT IN TAIL SECTION AND VERTICAL STABILIZER NEAR FUSELAGE.	AFTER CLIMB-OUT	FLUCTUATED AT FIRST, WENT OUT	S MIN AFTER RAM AIR EXTENDED	A/C ROLLED TO RIGHT. UNABLE TO STOP WITH RUDDER	2	40
HIT BY C SPEED BR CANOPY.	HIT BY CANNON FIRE ON LEFT SIDE OF A/C FROM SPEED BRAKE TO APPROXIMATELY 5 FT REAR OF CANOPY.	1	1	1	PILOT LOST ALL CONTROL EXCEPT RUDDER	2	ı
PILOT 71 OVERNE	PILOT FELT THREE THUMPS AT PULLOUT. OVERHEAT AND FIRE WARNING.		1	1	LOST CONTROL AFTER WARNING LIGHTS CAME ON, A/CHOSED OVER	YES	<
RICHT I	RIGHT WING ROOT. PILOT THOUGHT STABILITY Augmentation "Kicked-Off"	GRADUALLY DECAYED TO ZERO	WENT OUT FEW MIN- UTES AFTER P ₁		WAS TURNING TO LEFT WHEN P ₂ Went to zero	0	<
A/C RECEI ACCESSORY	A/C RECEIVED DIRECT HIT IN THE ACCESSORY SECTION.	1	1	I	DURING LEVEL-OFF AFTER A CLIMBING TURN, PILOT LOST CONTROL OF STABILIZER	<u>Q</u>	<
PILOT O	PILOT DID NOT FEEL HIT FIRE WARNING LIGHT CANE ON, FIRE CANE LATER	1	ı	ı	MUFFLED EXPLOSION FOLLOWED BY LOSS OF CONTROL, THEN FLAMEOUT	YES	<
A/C STRE Section	A/C STREAMED WHITE SMOKE FROM AFT SECTION	ı	ı	1	POSSIBLE FLIGHT CONTROL FAILURE EVIDENCED BY PORPOISING	Ŷ	≪
A /C HIT OF	A/C HIT ON RIGHT SIDE WHERE FLIGHT CONTROLS ARE.	ı	ı	l	BALLISTIC TYPE TRAJECTORY	2	~
FLANES	WERE SEEN COMING FROM A/C REAR	LOST		LOST		YES	⋖
PILOT F AUGNE	PILOT FELT HITS. FUEL PUMP AND STABILITY AUGMENTATION LIGHTS CAME ON	1	1	1		2	4

TABLE III (Cont'd)

	TYPE	4	<	=	«	14	<	<	<	<	<
	FIRE	YES	2	0 2	2	YES	0 X	YES	9	~	YES
	FINAL MANEUVER	FIRE MAY HAVE CAUSED FLIGHT CONTROL LOSS	BEST CONTROL WAS PITCH. CONTROLS DETERIORATED.		CONTROL STICK WOULD NOT NOVE LEFT OF CENTER IN ROLL AXIS, ENGINE SURGED	FIRE MAY HAVE CAUSED FLIGHT CONTROL LOSS.	NOSE OF A/C DROPPED. BACK PRESSURE RAISED IT, BUT NOT THE SECOND TIME IT HAPPENED	LOST FLIGHT CONTROLS	PILOT USED RAM AIR AND STATED THAT IT HELPED, THEN TRANSMITTED THAT HE HAD TO EJECT		STICK FROZE FROM LOSS OF Hydraulic fluid.
,	LOST ON UTIL I TY										
/n 11100\	PRESSURE LOST	J									
	HYDRAUCIC P,	•			1507				FAILED		LOST ABOUT 1½ MIN LATER
	DESCRIPTION OF HIT OR DAMAGE WHICH RESULTED IN LOSS OF FLIGHT CONTROL SYS.	II	AFTER HIT, ALL LIGHTS ON EXCEPT FIREWARNING. RUDDER CONTROLS SEVERED	GBSERVER NOTICED FLAK BEHIND A/C FOLLOWED BY STREAMING WHITE VAPOR. NO FLIGHT CONTROL DATA.	MASTER CAUTION AND RUDDER TRAVEL LIGHTS CAME ON. AFTER HITS LOST BOTH BOOST PUNPS AND AC GENERATOR.	FIRE ON LEFT SIDE OF A/C. A/C PITCHED DOWN.	A/C HIT IN REAR. FUEL FLOW INDICATOR SPINNING RAPIDLY AND HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILING.	FUEL AND FIRE COMING OUT OF A/C LOWER LEFT FUSELAGE.	PILOT FELT HIT	A/C HIT; COCKPIT FILLED WITH SWOKE, FLIGHT CONTROLS THEN LOST.	PILOT FELT EXPLOSION AND NOTED THAT P ₂ And utility systems were out. External Fire fed by streaming hydraulic fluid.
	WCIDENT	34	35	36	31	46	41	3	55	80	&

TABLE IV

FIRE

INCIDENT	RESULTANT DANAGE	LOCATION OF HIT	PROJECTILE Type	TYPE KILL
4	FIRE IN FUSELAGE AND ENGINE INTAKES, COMPRESSOR STALL.	AFT SECTION	~	
5	FIRE IN AFT SECTION		_	_
8	FIRE AND CONTROL LOSS	_	_	A
13	FIRE	?	_	A
14	FIRE	ELECTRONICS 1N Fus. Botton		В
15	FIRE IN TAIL		_	A
17	FIRE	AFT SECTION	GROUND FIRE	A
19	FIRE OBSERVED COMING FROM TAIL	 .	AUTO WEAPON FIRE	A
20	FIRE FROM WING ROOT	AFT OF COCKPIT	AUTO WEAPON FIRE	A
21	FIRE, LOST STABILIZER CONTROL	ACCESSORY SECTION	. 37 NN	Ą
23	FIRE LEFT WING ROOT, PIECES FROM A/C, PART OF LEFT WING MISSING	_	_	A .
25	BURNING FROM FORWARD OF INTAKES		_	A
28	FIRE AT HIT LOCATION, FLIGHT CONTROL LOSS	BETWEEN RIGHT WING AND FUSELAGE	37 OR 57 MN	A
29	FIRE OBSERVED AT AFT SECTION, FLIGHT CONTROLS AND HYDRAULICS.	_		A
32	FIRE	_		A .
33	FIRE IN TAIL PIPE, HIS GUN EXPLOADED	-	_	٨
34	FIRE FWD OF COCKPIT IN BATTERY COMPARTMENT, ELECTRIC AND FLIGHT CONTROLS	_	20 OR 37 NM	٨
39	FIRE IN BOMB BAY ENGINE	BOMB BAY	SMALL ARMS OR 37 NM	A
42	AFT SECTION ON FIRE	_	_	A
43	FIRE	_	57 NN	٨

TABLE IV (Cont'd)

INCIDENT	RESULTANT DAMAGE	LOCAT+ON OF HIT	PROJECTILE Type	TYPE KILL
46	FIRE, LEFT SIDE OF AIRCRAFT FLIGHT CONTROLS	-	_	K
50	FIRE ON BOTTOM OF FUSELAGE	_	AUTO WEAPON	A
52	BURST INTO FLAMES, AIRCRAFT SHREDDED	DETONATED 20 FT UNDER AIRCRAFT BOTTOM	SAM	KK
53	FIRE, AIRCRAFT DISINTEGRATED	_	(SAH)	K
54	FIRE, LOST FLIGHT CONTROL		_	٨
5 7	FIRE (TRAILING)	_	37 N N	_
58	FIRE, LOST FLIGHT CONTROL	_		A
59	FIRE, LOST UTILITY HYDRAULIC SYSTEM.LOST FLIGHT CONTROL	TAIL HOOK AREA	57 NN	A
60	FIRE	_	OWN BOMB	A

Security Classification DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R&D (Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified) 1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) 2 a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory SECRET Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 45433 3 NOFORN 3. REPORT TITLE An Analysis of F-105 Combat Losses in SEA (Out-Country) (U) 4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) 5. AUTHOR(S) (Last name, first name, initial) O'Brien, J. D. Meiselman, Jay M., 2d Lt, USAF 78. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 76. NO. OF REFS September 1967 8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO. 9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) AFFDL-TR-67-118 b. PROJECT NO. 1368 9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be essigned this report) . Task 136814 10. AVAILABILITY/LIMITATION NOTICES In addition to security requirements which apply to this document and must be met, each transmittal outside the agencies of the U.S. Government must have prior approval of the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory (FDTS), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 45433. 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 13. ABSTRACT (UNCLASSIFIED) This report contains an analysis of F-105 aircraft losses based on the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) Compendium of Aircraft Losses for the time period of 1 February 1965 to 31 January 1966. The analysis is performed for the purpose of providing an insight into areas such as threat, causes of aircraft loss, and time from initial damage to loss. (In addition to security requirements which must be met, this abstract is subject to special export controls and each transmittal to foreign governments or foreign nationals may be made only with prior approval of the Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory (FDTS), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 45433.)

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KEY WORDS	ROLE	wt	ROLE	wT	ROLE	WT
AIRCRAFT VULNERABILITY F-105 AIRCRAFT LOSS ANALYSIS SUBSYSTEM VULNERABILITY SEA COMBAT ENVIRONMENT						
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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 88TH AIR BASE WING (AFMC) WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO

MEMORANDUM FOR DTIC-RS

1 4 JUN 2002

ATTN: Kelly Akers Defense Technology Information Center 8725 John J. Kingman Rd, Suite 0944 Ft Belvoir VA 22060-6218

FROM: 88 CG/SCCMF

4375 5th Street Rm 150 WPAFB OH 45433-7802

SUBJECT: Change of Classification and Distribution Statement for Document Number's AD-C016-682 and AD-385-882

- 1. The attached 16 April 2001 letter from W. Howard Plunkett requests classification review of subject technical reports and change of distribution requirements from "Limited Distribution" to "Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited."
- 2. The requestor handcarried this request to the FOIA office, therefore it was treated as a FOIA request. Subsequently, it was reviewed by the Subject Matter Expert, Don Voyls, 46 OGM/OL-AC. His analysis states that the documents appear to be fully releasable. Capt Stephanie Masoni, his Security Manager, attached a memo indicating that she concurs to full release of the reports.
- 3. Please take the appropriate action to make subject technical reports available for public dissemination. The requester has been notified of this action. Point of contact at 88 CG/SCCMF is Lynn Kane at DSN 674-8189.

Sincerely,

SHEREE M. COON

Freedom of Information Act Manager Management Services Branch Information Management Division

Attachments:

- 1. AFMC Form 559, 6 June 2002
- 2. 46 OG/OGM/OL-AC Memo, 6 Jun 2002
- 3. Don Voyls Memo, 5 Jun 2002
- 4. Initial Request Letter, 16 Apr 2001
- **5**. AD 385-882
- 6. AD C016 682
- 7. 88CG/SCCMF Ltr to Requestor, 14 Jun 02



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS 46TH TEST WING (AFMC) EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA

6 June 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR 46 OG/OGM/OL-AC (Mr. Richard E. Colclough)

FROM: CAPT STEPHANIE MASONI (Unit Security Manager)

SUBJECT: Classification and Limited Distribution Requirement Review for Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Case #010421LK, W. Howard Plunkett.

I have reviewed the two documents in support of the attached FOIA request, and concur with Mr. Donald Voyls(memo attached); both documents are fully releasable to the public.

Stephonie C. Masoni, Capt, USAF

46 OG/OGM/OL-AC Security Manager

Attachment Memo dated 5 June 02 (Mr. Voyls) MEMO TO: 46TH OG/OGM/OL-AC

SUBJECT: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Case #010421LK, W. Howard Plunkett

I have reviewed the two documents in support of the attached FOIA request iaw the guidelines provided. Based on the instructions and directions provided (DoD Regulation 5400.7, Chapter 3 and DoD Directive 5230.25) I could not find any exemptions for withholding these documents from public disclosure. Therefore the documents appear to be Fully Releasable.

Review of AFFDL-TR-67-118, An Analysis of F-105 Combat Losses in SEA resulted in the following findings. The report was declassified 22 August 1990. The F-105 has been out of the USAF inventory for some time and I do not know of any other country operating that aircraft. The report draws general trends on F-105 combat losses. Some limited identification on the cause of loss based on hit location is provided on page 4 but in my opinion is common knowledge. In conclusion the author states that more detailed data was needed to increase the confidence of the analysis.

Review of AFFDL-TR-77-115, A Comparative Analysis of USAF Fixed Wing Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia Combat, AD-C016682 resulted in the following findings. The report was declassified 31 December 1988. The aircraft covered in this report with the exception of the B-52 and C/AC-130 are no longer in the USAF inventory. To my knowledge the German Air Force still flies the F-4. The report provides statistics on aircraft and crew losses relative to a variety of situations such as altitude, location, threat category, date, etc for all the aircraft except the B-52 and AC-130. Statistics on losses due to general causes (fuel fire, engine failure, flight controls) were provided. Data on the B-52, page 51, and AC-130, page 56, were limited to reasons for crash with no threat stated. Comparative analyses on the F-4 vs. F-105, one engine vs. two, and effectiveness of vulnerability reduction features were included. Though I personally have some small reservation on releasing the F-4 portion of this report to the public, I could not find any justification in the directives to withhold it.

According to the FOIA office, a memo from the classification officer stating that the reports are properly classified and marked is needed. Also, to aid in filling out form DD Form 2086 block 2, I spent 2 hours on Coordination/Approval/Denial and 11 hours on the review.

Let me know if you have any questions.

Don Voyls, 5 June 2002